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Abstract—Neural Networks (NNs) are vulnerable to adversar-
ial examples. Such inputs differ only slightly from their benign
counterparts yet provoke misclassifications of the attacked NNs.
The required perturbations to craft the examples are often neg-
ligible and even human imperceptible. To protect deep learning-
based systems from such attacks, several countermeasures have
been proposed with adversarial training still being considered
the most effective. Here, NNs are iteratively retrained using
adversarial examples forming a computational expensive and
time consuming process often leading to a performance decrease.
To overcome the downsides of adversarial training while still
providing a high level of security, we present a new training
approach we call entropic retraining. Based on an information-
theoretic-inspired analysis, entropic retraining mimics the effects
of adversarial training without the need of the laborious genera-
tion of adversarial examples. We empirically show that entropic
retraining leads to a significant increase in NNs’ security and
robustness while only relying on the given original data. With our
prototype implementation we validate and show the effectiveness
of our approach for various NN architectures and data sets.
Index Terms—Deep Learning, Adversarial Machine Learning,
Neural Network Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the remarkable performance of deep learning, neu-
ral networks (NNs) are nowadays used in a wide range of
domains. Their field of operation ranges from software prod-
ucts to consumer electronics and even industrial applications.
Often, NNs are used in security sensitive environments like
autonomous driving or intrusion detection systems. To ensure
a secure and safe operation, guarantees on the robustness of
the applied NNs are required. Unfortunately, NNs are known
to be vulnerable to so-called adversarial examples [5], [35],
[22]. Such slightly perturbed inputs change the classification
output of the attacked NNs potentially leading to severe
incidents. These perturbations within adversarial examples are
often human imperceptible, which makes the detection and
protection against them a difficult task. In computer vision
settings, the change of only one pixel in the input domain
often suffices to provoke such misclassifications [33]. Why
adversarial examples exist, and how to reliably defend against
them are open questions in the research community. Recent
findings by Ilyas et al. [13] suggest, that there might be
a misunderstanding of adversarial examples and how NNs
handle features in general. The authors divide the input space
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in robust and nonrobust features, whereas the latter are not hu-
man understandable and thus exploited by attacks to generate
misleading inputs.
Regarding countermeasures, adversarial training is still con-
sidered to be the most effective approach. To apply this
intuitive method, the training set needs to be extended by
adversarial examples. Madry et al. [21] describe adversarial
training as a min-max problem and suggest their PGD attack
method as the generation approach during the process. Yet,
additional research is required to further improve adversar-
ial training and explore approaches to overcome its natural
downsides. This includes alternative approaches to the current
state of the art of iteratively creating adversarial examples,
which is time consuming and has negative effects on the
resulting performance of the hardened NNs. An important
contribution marking the first step into this direction was
presented by Shafahi et al. [27]. The authors introduce the first
adversarial-example-free training procedure, achieving high
levels of robustness. In a similar spirit, we present a new
information-theoretic-inspired approach.
In this paper, we first shed light on adversarial training
and analyze its impacts on NNs. Here, we profit from two
intriguing research directions which gained attention in re-
cent years. On the one hand, we build upon the findings
in activation analysis. Recent work in this area analyzed
the hidden activation values of NNs to gain insights about
the processed inputs [31], [32]. It is shown that the hidden
activations carry information highly relevant for a security-
related analysis of NNs. Additionally, we take into account
approaches using information-theoretic concepts to understand
NNs [38], [30], [11], [4], [36]. Combining these two worlds
reveals new aspects of how neural networks behave under
different circumstances and types of inputs. This fusion leads
to a new training approach, which we call entropic retraining.
We empirically show, that this training procedure mimics the
effects of adversarial training, significantly improving the ro-
bustness of NNs. Interestingly, this approach does not require
adversarial examples and works for various NN architectures
and data sets using the original input data only.
In summary we make the following contributions:
• We analyze the impacts of adversarial training on NNs
using information-theoretic-inspired approaches.
• We leverage the knowledge of this analysis and present
a new training method that we call entropic retraining.
• We implement and evaluate our new training method and
show a significant improvement in robustness for various
NN architectures and two data sets.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Adversarial Examples
In this paper, we introduce a new training approach for
NNs mimicking the effects of adversarial training and thus
significantly increasing robustness. This level of robustness
describes the potential of an attacker performing so-called
evasion attacks. Here, during test-time only the inputs to the
attacked NNs may be changed. The aim of such an evasion
attack is to generate adversarial examples which are close to
their benign counterparts but still provoke misclassifications.
Formally, adversarial examples can be defined as follows:
Definition: Adversarial Examples. Let f(·) be a trained
NN performing classifications. Let H(·) be a human oracle
performing the same classifications and similar capabilities
such that for a given benign input x the following holds:
f(x) = H(x) (1)
Let x’ be a permuted version of x under the constraint of
visual similarity, i.e., ‖x’ − x‖ 6 ǫ for some small ǫ ∈ R+.
Then x’ is an adversarial example, if the following holds:
H(x) = H(x’) ∧ f(x’) 6= H(x’). (2)
Test-time evasion attacks can be divided into white-box
and black-box approaches which differ in the amount of
information available for the attacker [9]. Whereas in white-
box attacks the attacker has complete access to the attacked
model, in black-box attacks only the input-output relation is
visible. In this paper, we focus on the more effective white-
box attacks such as the “Fast Gradient Sign Method” (FGSM)
[12], or the “Projected Gradient Descent” (PGD) [21] attack.
The currently most effective white-box approach, the C&W
attack, was introduced by Carlini and Wagner [6]. Here, a
cost function fy is introduced as an optimization substitute
opposed to previous approaches were the loss function was
used directly. In Section V-C we introduce the attacks we
considered throughout this paper in more detail.
B. Robustness Quantification
State-of-the-art research on NN robustness still lacks mean-
ingful and generally applicable robustness metrics. Currently,
lp-norms are used to calculate the distance between adversarial
examples and their benign counterparts as an indicator for the
robustness of the analyzed NN. It is assumed that high lp-
based distances directly correlate with the exhibited level of
robustness. In the majority of cases, this approach poses a
viable solution, yet it is shown that new robustness metrics
are needed to cover a wider variety of possible scenarios
[29], [26]. Recent work has provided some alternatives, for
example Wang et al. with their CleverScore [39]. While being
a viable solution quantifying the robustness of a wide range
of NNs, this metric cannot be applied to all architectures.
Therefore, in this paper, we stick to the traditional approach
of measuring NNs’ robustness using lp-norms. More precisely,
we craft adversarial examples with constant lp-distances com-
pared to their benign counterparts. Subsequently, we measure
the fraction of successful adversarial examples, i.e. examples
which lead to misclassification, and refer to this fraction as
the attack success rate in the following. This approach is still
widely used in adversarial machine learning and thus allows
a direct comparison to related research.
C. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is still considered to be the most
effective countermeasure to protect NNs against evasion at-
tacks. Even though adversarial training is well researched and
evaluated, some aspects still remain unclear: for instance, the
full impact on the protected NNs and how to further improve
the concept of adversarial training in general. The trade-off be-
tween the resulting level of robustness and final accuracy of the
model is known, but yet to be fully understood. Furthermore,
the adequate setting of hyperparameters poses an uncertainty
for developers trying to protect their NNs using adversarial
training. Here, the number of epochs, learning rate, or attack
parameters need to be defined and are often set following a
laborious empirical approach. Recent work by Shafahi et al.
[27] showed that adversarial training can be further improved
and even performed at reduced cost. The authors reuse the
gradient information available during the updates of the model
parameters during normal training. With this approach, the
authors achieve a similar level of robustness compared to
PGD-based adversarial training, without the generation of
adversarial examples.
Still, to shed more light on adversarial training, we inspect
NNs using information-theoretic-inspired approaches at differ-
ent robustness levels. In this paper, we follow the adversarial
training approach presented by Madry et al. using the PGD
attack method [21]. During this iterative process the following
min-max problem is solved:
min
θ
ρ(θ). (3)
with
ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D[max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)] (4)
D. Activation Analysis
In this new research direction, the hidden activation values
of NNs are analyzed to observe their behavior and detect
irregularities in the input space. Inspired by neuron coverage
guided testing [20], [23], [24], [34] several new methods have
been proposed, directly analyzing the hidden activations. For
example Sperl et al. [31] observe the hidden activations of NNs
while processing benign and adversarial inputs. By training a
secondary NN on the extracted hidden activations acting as
a binary classifier, the authors are able to detect adversarial
examples fed to the initial NN. Using their method, the authors
are able to reliably detect attacks for various NN architectures,
data sets, and types of data. Further refined and improved,
Sperl and Schulze [32] use this approach in the more general
semi-supervised setting of anomaly detection. The authors
are able to detect anomalies even with a small amount of
anomalous samples available during training. These findings
indicate that the hidden activations of NNs carry security-
sensitive information highly relevant for the understanding of
the robustness of such systems.
Throughout this paper, we take into account previous re-
search in this field and therefore introduce the concept in
a more formal manner. As presented in Section II-A, NNs
can be described by f(x; θ) = yˆ, where θ are the learned
parameters, x the inputs, and yˆ the predictions of the NN.
With respect to the layers, this function can be written as
f = f1 ◦ . . . ◦ fM . For each layer, fi(x; θ) = hi describes the
layer output after the application of the activation function. We
call the concatenation of all outputs as the activation values
based on which we present our new training approach.
E. Related Work
In the following we shortly present the most related publica-
tions using information-theoretic approaches to study NNs. We
focus on work improving the understanding of NNs in general
and especially the robustness against adversarial examples. In
2000, Tishby et al. [37] introduced the information bottleneck
(IB) method solving the problem of distributional clustering.
The findings were further refined, e.g. by Tishby et al. [38],
and used to shed light on the training of NNs. Shwartz-Ziv and
Tishby [30] introduced their so-called information planes as
a metric describing the information flow during NN training.
The authors analyze the mutual information between the layers
and make the following observations: First, NNs perform
a compression of the inputs to a compact representation.
Then, by neglecting or forgetting parts of the compressed
information, NNs achieve better generalization and overall
performance. In 2019, Achille et al. [3] investigated NNs using
information-theoretic approaches as well and make similar
observations. The authors show that models which generalize
well, often show a low level of information.
Based on these findings and concepts, we investigate the
impacts of adversarial training on NNs. Closely related in this
regard are the contributions by Terzi et al. [36] published in
2020, showing that adversarial training reduces information
in NNs. Using this insight, the authors empirically show
that robust models show a better transferability characteristic
compared to their unsecured counterparts for the CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100 data sets. In this paper, we profit from this
finding and present a new training approach we call entropic
retraining.
III. THREAT MODEL
Following the guideline on the evaluation of adversarial de-
fense methods by Carlini et al. [7] we present the threat model
we considered throughout our experiments. We elaborate on
the conditions under which we tested the robustness of our
countermeasure to give the reader a better insight and provide
the basis for future work. In the case of adversarial machine
learning, a threat model describes the following aspects and
attacker capabilities:
• Goals of the adversary
• Capabilities of the adversary
• Knowledge of the adversary
The goal of an attacker can either be to alter the classifi-
cation output in a non-targeted manner to an arbitrary class
or to lead the NN to predict a chosen, targeted class. Here,
we solely evaluate non-targeted attacks. We expect that the
experiments as well as the results can be directly transferred
to the non-targeted setting.
When performing evasion attacks, the capabilities of the
adversary are limited to changes in the input space during
run-time. Hence, the network parameters and weights are not
accessible and remain unchanged during the attack process.
The impact of the changes on the input performed by an
attacker are usually measured using lp-norms as described
earlier. In image classification tasks and machine learning in
general, typically the l0, l2, or l∞ distances are considered. In
this paper, we solely utilize attack methods which are bound
by the l2 and l∞ norm.
Finally, the adversary’s knowledge can range from a black-
box setting where solely the input-output behaviour of the
model is visible, to a fully white-box setting. In this case,
the attacker additionally observes the model’s gradients, ac-
tivations, and weights to specifically craft attacks for the
architecture leveraging all available information. We assume
attackers with white-box capabilities. Hence, we use specifi-
cally crafted adversarial examples to lead our models under
attack to misclassifications. Carlini and Wagner [8] suggested
that when presenting new defense strategies, the robustness
against adaptive attacks needs to be evaluated. In this attack
setting, adversaries adapt their attack methods to exploit the
characteristics of the applied defense strategies. Even though
we assume the attackers to be aware of our modified training
method, further attack methods targeting the information-
theoretic properties of the models under attack are out of scope
of this paper and left for future work.
IV. ENTROPIC RETRAINING
In this section we introduce our main contribution, a mod-
ified training approach we call entropic retraining. Entropic
retraining mimics the effects of adversarial training, providing
a comparable increase in the robustness of NNs. Based on the
adapted loss function and optimization goal, entropic retrain-
ing does not rely on the time consuming and computational
expensive process of generating adversarial examples.
For better understanding, we first evaluate adversarial train-
ing and the behavior of the resulting robust NNs. We then
transfer our findings to an adversarial example free case.
A. Preliminary Analysis
We assess the impact of adversarial and entropic training
using two information-theoretic-inspired values. Mainly, we
were inspired by the classical Shannon entropy [28] defined
as:
H(x) = −
∑
i
p(xi) log(p(xi)). (5)
Here, we directly use the hidden activation values of each layer
of the NN. More precisely, we extract the activation values hi
of each layer i ∈ 1, ..,M and calculate E(hi) as follows:
E(hi) = −
Ni∑
j=1
hj log(hj), (6)
with Ni being the number of neurons in layer i. To finally
calculate the network-entropy-related value EN we first nor-
malize E(hi) with respect to the number of neurons in the
layer and then average the result with respect to the number
of layers in the NN:
EN =
1
M
M∑
i=1
1
Ni
E(hi). (7)
Moreover, we introduce and evaluate ET , which layer-
wise quantifies the differences in E(hi) and thus allows an
evaluation of the information-related flow through the NN.
More formally, we define ET as follows:
ET =
1
M − 1
M−1∑
i=1
E(hi)− E(hi+1)
=
1
M − 1
(E(h1)− E(hM ))
(8)
Note, that we do not normalize the E(hi) values to calculate
ET . We argue that non-normalized values provide a more
useful picture of the information-related flow in this case.
During the adversarial training process and the solving of
the earlier introduced min-max problem some of the weights
might be set to negligible magnitudes. This would lead to
neurons with an insignificant impact on the resulting level of
information. Hence, normalizing E(hi) would hide this effect.
We base our assumption on the contribution by Ilyas et al.
[13]. The authors argue, that models require to forget some
of the non-robust features to be more robust. This correlates
to neglecting information of certain neurons trained to process
these non-robust features. To capture this effect and the overall
impact of adversarial training on the NNs, we do not normalize
the components of ET .
In summary, with our newly introduced values EN and ET
at hand we evaluate the information-theoretic-related proper-
ties of the NNs during input processing.
B. Impacts of Adversarial Training
For our experiment in which we want to visualize the impact
of adversarial training, we considered the following settings
and model under test (MUT). We used a pretrained Lenet
5 CNN [18] model. This architecture is designed to classify
the simple and widely used MNIST data set. For the sake of
readability, we introduce the architecture and data set in more
detail in Section V-B.
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Fig. 1: Evolution of the robustness during adversarial training
of the Lenet 5 model classifying MNIST when attacked using
FGSM.
During the adversarial training process, we calculated EN
and ET after every five epochs. In summary, we adversarially
trained the MUT for 200 epochs. In Figure 1 we show the
resulting attack success rate for each instance of the MUT.
To quantify the model’s level of robustness, we generated l∞-
bound (ǫ = 0.3) adversarial examples using FGSM with images
randomly drawn from the test set. Due to this limitation in
the permutation space, not all images resulted in a successful
misclassification, allowing the calculation of the attack success
rate. As expected, for a higher number of epochs in adversarial
training we see a decrease in the attack success rate, indicating
a robustification of the MUT. With Figures 2 and 3 we visu-
alize the impact of adversarial training on the same instances
of the MUT using the previously introduced EN and ET . In
Figure 2 we see a decrease in EN allowing the following
conclusion which strongly corresponds to the contribution of
Terzi et al. [36]:
Adversarial training decreases EN .
This effect is already visible after five epochs of adversarial
training. Furthermore, a strong correlation between the evo-
lution of the attack success rate and EN is given. As stated
before and corresponding to previous work [13], [36], adver-
sarial training increases the model’s robustness by boosting
the generality of the MUT at the cost of its initial accuracy
[40].
In Figure 3 we observe a similar behavior of the NNs when
observing ET . The plot shows, that ET increases with higher
level of robustness. Together with the previous observation
of decreasing attack success rates, this suggests a negative
correlation between ET and the level of robustness achieved
during adversarial training. This effect is even more visible for
robust models, which brings us to the following assumption:
Adversarial training increases ET .
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Fig. 2: EN for the Lenet 5 Model classifying the MNIST data
set during adversarial training.
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Fig. 3: ET for the Lenet 5 Model classifying the MNIST data
set during adversarial training.
C. Entropic Retraining Objective
With the above figures and observations at hand, we present
the concept of entropic retraining. Our new training concept
mimics the effects of adversarial training, without the need
of adversarial examples. Above, we observed that adversarial
training yields NNs with lower levels of EN and higher levels
of ET . This motivates us to incorporate ET in an adapted
loss function. During entropic retraining, we optimize the
performance of the model while simultaneously increasing
ET . Formally, we define our adapted loss function as follows:
Ltot = Lscce(y, yˆ) + λ · LT (ET , EˆT ). (9)
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Fig. 4: EN for the Lenet 5 Model classifying the MNIST data
set during entropic retraining.
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Fig. 5: ET for the Lenet 5 Model classifying the MNIST data
set during entropic retraining.
with
Lscce(y, yˆ) = −
N∑
i=1
yilog(pyˆi). (10)
being the standard sparse categorical cross-entropy and
LT (ET , EˆT ) = (EˆT − σET )
2
. (11)
Here, ET is the value of the original pretrained model,
while EˆT is calculated during entropic retraining. The factors
λ, σ ∈ R+ are positive hyperparameters set in the optimization
process before training.
D. Impacts of Entropic Retraining
In this section we show the impacts of entropic retraining
with the following experiment: We performed entropic retrain-
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Fig. 6: Evolution of the robustness during entropic retraining
of the Lenet 5 model classifying MNIST when attacked using
FGSM.
ing with the same pretrained MUT from above based on the
Lenet 5 architecture. During this process, we calculated EN
and ET . To assess the achieved level of robustness after every
five epochs, we attacked the resulting instances of the MUT
and measured the achieved attack success rates. In Figures 4
and 5 we show the evolution of EN and ET , respectively.
Compared to adversarial training, we see the same effects for
the resulting robust model. With our experiments we make the
following observation:
Entropic retraining decreases EN .
Moreover:
Entropic retraining increases ET .
This observation suggests that entropic retraining indeed mim-
ics adversarial training with respect to the introduced values
EN and ET . Remarkably, we achieve this only using the
original inputs without the generation of adversarial examples.
In Figure 6 we show the attack success rates for the model
after entropic retraining. Again, the same effect as in the
previously performed adversarial training is visible. The attack
success rate decreases with the number of performed entropic
retraining epochs. With this observation, we provide first
strong indicators, that an analysis of the information-theoretic
behavior of NNs gives insights about their level of robustness.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In the following we extend our initial observation to a
thorough and statistically sound evaluation. Hence, we intro-
duce details on our implementation, considered data sets, and
evaluated NN architectures. For our prototype implementation
we used Keras [10] and ran the training procedures on an Intel
Xeon E5-2640 v4 server with an NVIDIA Titan X GPU.
A. Considered Data Sets
We used the MNIST [19] and CIFAR-10 [16] image
datasets. The two data sets are commonly used in machine
learning research and allow an easy comparison to exist-
ing countermeasures, especially adversarial training. MNIST
consists of 70000 handwritten digits ranging from 0 to 9
represented by 28 × 28 gray-scale pixels. CIFAR-10 consists
of 60000 colored images represented by 32× 32× 3 pixels.
B. Considered Neural Networks
Throughout our evaluation we considered three different
NN architectures. For the sake of comparability and to ease
reproducibility we utilized publicly available and thoroughly
evaluated architectures. For MNIST, we considered the Lenet 5
architecture [18] and an example model provided by Keras [2].
Similarly, for CIFAR-10 we used the example model provided
by Keras [1]. In Table I we summarize the considered NNs
and show details regarding their architectures and the executed
training processes. Note, that for both Keras examples models,
we slightly changed the architectures and neglected the drop-
out layers.
C. Considered Attack Methods
We considered the following four attack methods: PGD
[21], BIM [17], FGSM [12], and C&W [6]. For the PGD attack
we considered both, the l2 and l∞ bound versions which we
call L2PGD and LinfPGD in the following. BIM and FGSM
are l∞ bound while we chose the l2 bound version of the
C&W attack. We motivate our choice of attacks based on
their performance and popularity and to provide a diverse
assessment of the quality of our proposed countermeasure.
Note, that we used the foolbox framework [25] to generate
adversarial examples using the above stated methods. For
MNIST we limit ǫ to 4.5 and 0.3 for l2 and l∞ bound attacks,
respectively. Similarly, for CIFAR-10 we limit ǫ to 0.95 and
0.03 for l2 and l∞ bound attacks, respectively.
D. Entropic Retraining Settings
In Table II we summarize the settings we chose to perform
entropic retraining for the three MUTs. Setting the parameters,
we followed an intuitive approach and did not perform an
extensive search. Hereby, we want to show the simplicity
of our approach underlining the ease of use. We used the
adam optimizer [15] to train the three models and chose
similar settings in each case. As the gradient calculation during
entropic retraining poses a rather complex task, we used small
batches. With this, we aim to avoid sharper minimizers during
training, which would lead to a decrease in generalization as
shown by Keskar et al. [14]. For both MNIST models we
chose a batch size of four, while the CIFAR-10 model was
trained with a batch size of 64. Accordingly, we set the number
of epochs to 200 and 500 for the MNIST and CIFAR-10
experiments, respectively. Finally, we set the weighting factor
σ based on the observations shown in Section IV-B. As we
want to increase ET , we chose σ > 1.
TABLE I: ARCHITECTURES AND PERFORMANCE OF THE CONSIDERED NEURAL NETWORKS
Data Set Model Model Details Training Settings Test Accuracy
MNIST
Lenet 5 [18]
– 2 convolutional layers with filter
sizes 5 and 16
– each convolutional layer is fol-
lowed by a average-pooling layer
– finally, 3 dense layers with 120,
84, and 10 neurons each
– no drop-out layers
– optimizer: adam
– learning rate: 0.001
– epochs = 24
– batch size: 64
99.05%
MNIST Keras CNN [2]
– 2 convolutional layers with filter
sizes 32 and 64
– followed by 1 max-pooling layer
– finally, 3 dense layers with 512,
84, and 10 neurons each
– no drop-out layers
– optimizer: adam
– learning rate: 0.001
– epochs = 12
– batch size: 128
99.13%
CIFAR-10 CIFAR Keras CNN [1]
– 4 convolutional layers, the first
two with filter of size 32, the sec-
ond pair with filter size of 64
– each pair of convolutional layers
is followed by a max-pooling layer
– finally, 6 dense layers with 512,
256, 128, 128, 84, and 10 neurons
each
– no drop-out layers
– optimizer: RMSprop
– learning rate: 0.0001
– epochs = 50
– batch size: 32
– using data augmentation
83.10%
TABLE II: ENTROPIC RETRAINING SETTINGS FOR THE
CONSIDERED NEURAL NETWORKS
Data Set Model Entropic Retraining Settings
MNIST
Lenet 5
– optimizer: adam
– learning rate: 0.0009
– epochs = 200
– batch size: 4
– λ: 1
– σ: 1.65
MNIST Keras CNN
– optimizer: adam
– learning rate: 0.001
– epochs = 200
– batch size: 4
– λ: 1
– σ: 1.65
CIFAR-10 CIFAR Keras CNN
– optimizer: adam
– learning rate: 0.0005
– epochs = 500
– batch size: 64
– λ: 1
– σ: 1.01
E. Baselines
To assess the impacts of entropic retraining and the charac-
teristics of the resulting robust models, we defined the follow-
ing baselines. We used the pretrained models as introduced in
Table I and performed two experiments. First, we observed the
models’ performance classifying the benign original data, as
well as noisy input images. With this experiment we evaluated
whether entropic retraining increases the sensitivity of the
MUTs towards slight but unintentional perturbations. To create
the noisy input images we again used the foolbox framework
and generated two sets of test images. For both sets, foolbox
generated noise which is added to the original input images.
Here, we chose the noise to either be l2 or l∞ constrained.
This allows a direct comparison to the performance of the
NNs when classifying adversarial examples bound by the same
distance metrics. Hence, in the MNIST setting, for the l2
and l∞ constrained noise generation we set ǫ to 4.5 and 0.3,
respectively. Similarly, in the CIFAR-10 setting we chose ǫ
to be 0.95 and 0.03. In Table V we summarize the resulting
accuracy values. For the two data sets and three MUTs we
observe that noisy images are classified with a similar accuracy
compared to their original counterparts. The impact of noise
on the performance of all MUTs is negligible as it decreases
the accuracy scores by less than 5%. We conclude, that
the performance of the originally pretrained MUTs is robust
towards noise.
Secondly, we evaluated the robustness of the pretrained
MUTs by performing attacks with the five introduced methods.
As shown in Section II-B, we quantify the NNs’ robustness by
evaluating the attack success rates using l2 and l∞ constrained
attacks. Note, that we solely used images which are originally
classified correctly by the MUTs to measure the attack success
rates. In Table III, we summarize the achieved rates. We clearly
see, as also seen in previous work, unsecured models are easily
attacked. For the three MUTs, the attacks achieved nearly
perfect scores and show the low level of robustness in this
case.
VI. EVALUATION
The Tables IV and VI summarize the main results of our
paper for the three models after entropic retraining. Again, we
evaluated the performance against original and noisy images,
as well as the attack success rates. In both cases, we did
not change any parameters unrelated to entropic retraining
compared to the experiments using the original models shown
in Section V-E.
Table VI shows the accuracy scores of the three MUTs when
classifying the original as well as noisy inputs. For MNIST,
Lenet’s performance decreased by 1.3% when classifying the
original inputs. For the noisy inputs, the accuracy scores
TABLE III: ATTACK SUCCESS RATES WHEN ATTACKING THE ORIGINAL NEURAL NETWORKS
Data Set Model
Attack Success Rates using the following methods:
LinfPGD BIM FGSM C&W1 L2PGD
MNIST
Lenet 5 99.92% 99.95% 79.56% 4.16% (90.84%) 99.04%
M. Keras CNN 99.76% 99.65% 59.89% 4.75% (88.99%) 99.58%
CIFAR-10 C. Keras CNN 100% 100% 96.17% 98.39% (100%) 100%
TABLE IV: ATTACK SUCCESS RATES WHEN ATTACKING THE NEURAL NETWORKS AFTER ENTROPIC RETRAINING
Data Set Model
Attack Success Rates using the following methods:
LinfPGD BIM FGSM C&W1 L2PGD
MNIST
Lenet 5 14.48% 3.48% 2.95% 0.58% (90.58%) 5.19%
M. Keras CNN 1.07% 0.06% 0.06% 0.01% (91.16%) 0.72%
CIFAR-10 C. Keras CNN 83.15% 80.05% 75.75% 67.03% (94.90%) 69.41%
TABLE V: ACCURACY OF THE ORIGINAL NEURAL NET-
WORKS
Data set Model
Tested with:
Original l2Noise l∞Noise
MNIST
Lenet 5 99.05% 98.59% 98.51%
M. Keras CNN 99.13% 98.51% 98.46%
CIFAR-10 C. Keras CNN 83.10% 80.80% 80.90%
TABLE VI: ACCURACY OF THE NEURAL NETWORKS AFTER
ENTROPIC RETRAINING
Data set Model
Tested with:
Original l2Noise l∞Noise
MNIST
Lenet 5 97.73% 95.19% 94.90%
M. Keras CNN 99.07% 98.28% 98.16%
CIFAR-10 C. Keras CNN 85.60% 83.70% 83.70%
decreased by 3.5% and 3.7% for the l2 and l∞ constrained
cases, respectively. The capability of the Keras example model
classifying MNIST images decreased by 0.1%. In this case,
the l2 and l∞ constrained noisy images were classified 0.2%
and 0.3% less accurate. Interestingly, for the CIFAR-10 MUT
we find an increase in accuracy of 3% when classifying the
original inputs. This is also visible for noisy images, here the
model performed 3.59% and 3.46% better for the l2 and l∞
constrained examples. In summary, we conclude that entropic
retraining does not decrease the natural performance of the
models and in some cases even provides higher accuracy
values. Furthermore, the robustness against noise did not
decrease and the MUTs achieved similar levels of accuracy
compared to their initial versions.
More importantly, we want to focus on the resulting levels
of robustness for the three MUTs. Thus, in Table IV we present
the main results of our paper. We observe a significant increase
in robustness for all data sets, MUTs, and attack methods. For
the MNIST data set, only one attack achieved a success rate
greater than 10%. This is the case when attacking Lenet 5
with the l∞ bound PGD method. For the remaining scenarios,
we measured success rates of well below 10% and in some
1In some cases, the C&W attack produced black-only images. We discarded
these for the calculation of the attack success rate. The rate in the parentheses
is produced including the black-only images.
cases even close to 0%. Evaluating the CIFAR-10 data set we
see a significant decrease in the attack success rates as well.
In the worst case, for the l∞ PGD attack, the attack success
rate decreased by 16.85%. For the l2 bound PGD and C&W
methods the success rates decreased by more than 30%.
In summary, we find increased levels of robustness without
loosing the capability of reliably classifying original as well
as noisy inputs.
VII. DISCUSSION
Our adapted loss function allows an information-theoretic
lossy but robust training process for NNs. We observe that
entropic retraining generalizes well and achieves good results
for two data sets and different NN architectures. Note, for
the sake of simplicity we kept the parameter optimization in
our experiments as short as possible. We used similar settings
for all three MUTs to show the simplicity of our approach.
A deliberate choice of parameters with respect to the chosen
architecture and use-case may further improve the results. For
example, the number of epochs heavily influences the trade-off
between robustness and accuracy. Future work may evaluate
the performance of the approach using more complex data sets
and NN architectures as well as an extensive hyperparameter
search to understand the impacts of the settings to their full
extent. Our positive results clearly show the need for more
research leveraging these initial observations. We expect that
more work in this direction will lead to an even clearer
picture and understanding of the meaning of robustness. To
this end, we hope that our findings help to approach the
difficult question of how to reliably quantify and improve NN
robustness.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present, implement, and evaluate a new
training approach for NNs we call entropic retraining. Based
on our information-theoretic-inspired analysis of adversarial
training we gain new insights in the information flow of
robust models. This motivates us to adapt and expand currently
used loss functions. With entropic retraining, we optimize for
accuracy and robustness simultaneously. Our evaluation clearly
indicates the effectiveness of entropic retraining for multiple
data sets and NN architectures.
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